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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920426-CA 
v. : 
FERNANDO RUESGA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order revoking probation for 
a conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(cocaine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992). This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court properly find that defendant 
had wilfully violated his probation by failing to sign the 
probation agreement? "'The decision to grant, modify, or revoke 
probation is in the discretion of the trial court.' . . . [On 
appeal,] an appellant 'must show that the evidence of a probation 
violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its 
discretion in revoking' appellant's probation." State v. 
Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. 
Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990)). "Therefore, the [trial] 
court's determination that a defendant violated his probation is 
a finding of fact which must be upheld unless such determination 
is clearly erroneous." State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209 
(Utah App. 1991). 
2. Is the trial court's finding that defendant had "an 
adequate command of the English language to fully understand" the 
conditions of probation and court proceedings clearly erroneous? 
A trial court's factual finding must be upheld on appeal unless 
"clearly erroneous," meaning that "it is against the clear weight 
of the evidence." Martinez, 811 P.2d at 209. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES AND RULES 
The language of any constitutional provision, statute 
or rule determinative of this case is cited in the body of this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992) (R. 
7-8). On February, 18, 1992, defendant pled guilty as charged; 
in return, the State agreed to dismiss another pending criminal 
case (R. 19, 22). On April 6, 1992, defendant was sentenced to 
the statutory term of zero-to-five years imprisonment. The 
sentence was stayed and defendant placed on probation for 18 
months under the supervision of the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department (R. 33-34). 
Three weeks later, the court issued an order to show 
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cause why defendant's probation should not be revoked based on 
his refusal to sign the probation agreement (R. 38-39). 
Defendant denied the allegation (R. 36-37, 104). On June 2, 
1992, an evidentiary hearing was held, after which the court 
found that defendant had wilfully violated his probation (R. 45-
46, 59-61, 109-113). Probation was revoked and defendant 
sentenced to the original sentence of imprisonment with credit 
for time served (R. 46-48, 132-135). On June 9, 1992, the 
court's oral findings of a violation were reduced to writing (R. 
59-61). 
Defendant filed objections to the written findings, a 
motion for reconsideration of sentence, and a motion to stay 
sentence pending appeal (R. 49-50, 51-52, 62-63, 68-69). The 
objections were overruled and motions denied (R. 81-82, 143-145). 
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. This Court 
subsequently granted defendant's petition for a certificate of 
probable cause and defendant was released from custody. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Facing two criminal charges, defendant pled guilty to 
the unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) (R. 
19, 22-28). A presentence report was ordered. Apparently, in 
the initial report, there was some dispute as to the extent of 
defendant's prior criminal convictions (R. 30, 92). After the 
report was modified, defense counsel agreed that defendant had 
been convicted of three misdemeanors in 1990: retail theft, 
intoxication in and around a vehicle, and resisting arrest; and 
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two misdemeanors in 1991: alcohol-related reckless driving and 
driving without a license (R. 92-93). A charge of driving while 
intoxicated was also pending (R. 93, 96). 
During the sentencing hearing, defendant claimed that 
he was no longer drinking but recognized that he needed alcohol 
treatment (R. 94-96). 
Despite the recommendation of Adult Probation and 
Parole (A.P.P.) that defendant be incarcerated, the court 
determined that defendant was an appropriate candidate for 
probation (R. 96-97). The court sentenced defendant to the 
statutory term of zero to five years imprisonment and a $5000 
fine but stayed both (R. 33, 97). Defendant was placed on 18 
months probation under the supervision of A.P.P. upon the 
condition that he serve 6 months in jail and pay "$1,500 of the 
fine . . . [a]dded to that is the twenty-five percent surcharge" 
fid.). The court imposed the usual drug and alcohol conditions 
and instructed defendant: 
You're not to use controlled substances, 
you're not to have paraphernalia in your 
possession, you're not to associate with 
people who use controlled substances, and you 
are not to have any prescriptions, or — from 
a medical Doctor, without your probation 
officer knowing about it. As far as alcohol, 
you're not to use alcohol during the period 
of time that you're on probation. You are to 
enter into, and successfully complete any 
drug or alcohol programs Adult Probation and 
Parole thinks is appropriate. Not to, like I 
say, use alcohol. You're not to frequent 
bars during the period of time that you're on 
probation. I want you working full-time, and 
I want you to establish a permanent address. 
(R. 34, 96-97). (See Addendum A for a copy of the judgment and 
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conviction.) 
Approximately 10 days after being placed on probation, 
defendant was contacted in the jail by Lisa Shavers. Ms. Shavers 
has been a probation officer since 1984 and has personally 
supervised thousands of probationers (R. 112). She and another 
probation officer went to the jail to have defendant sign his 
probation agreement and to fully explain the terms of his 
probation (R. 112-113). Beginning with defendant's obligation to 
report to A.P.P., Ms. Shavers explained that he needed to notify 
A.P.P. of any residential moves and could not leave the state 
without permission (R. 113-114). With this, defendant became 
"extremely argumentative" and told Ms. Shavers that 
he was not going to comply. He said that the 
figure that I [Ms. Shavers] had for the fine 
of lf875 was incorrect; that what I had 
written down here was not what happened in 
court, that — he just became extremely 
profane, and argumentative, and got more and 
more so. 
He said fuck the Judge, fuck this shit, 
I'm not going to do it. You can't make me do 
it. There was another probationer sitting 
next to him who he told that [sic] man also 
didn't have to do what we were asking, that I 
couldn't make him do it, and that the Judge 
hadn't said what I was telling him to do. 
(R. 114). Defendant remained agitated; he stated: 
[H]e was going to go to Mexico, he was not 
going to do anything that I [Ms. Shavers] had 
requested, and he would not even calm down 
enough to enter into a discussion about the 
problems that he saw. He just continued to 
argue and state that he didn't have to do 
what either Judge Hanson or I was asking him 
to do, and he wasn't going to do it. 
(R. 116). Based on defendant's conduct and her experience, Ms. 
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Shavers believed that defendant fully understood the nature of 
the probation agreement and its terms; the problem was that he 
did not like its contents (R. 114-115, 116-117). She concluded 
that he "would not be easily supervised" and reported the problem 
to the court (R. 116, 40). (See Addendum B for a copy of the 
A.P.P. report and affidavit.) 
The court issued an order to show cause why the 
probation should not be revoked based on defendant's refusal to 
sign the probation agreement (R. 38-39, 41-42). (See Addendum B 
for a copy of the Order to Show Cause). During the initial 
hearing, the court stated that everyone could "screw around with 
this, or Mr. Ruesga can sign his probation agreement" (R. 87). 
Defense counsel responded that he needed two weeks to "work these 
things out" (R. 87-88). The court agreed but warned defendant 
and his counsel: 
You can work whatever you want out. If Mr. 
Ruesga doesn't sign the probation agreement, 
he's going to prison. Simple as that. Two 
weeks. 
(R. 88). 
Two weeks later, defendant had still not signed the 
probation agreement (R. 102). The court expressed frustration 
that defendant had not signed the agreement during the preceding 
two week continuance; the court felt it was being "jerked" around 
by defendant (R. 102-103). Counsel asserted that defendant was 
not "refusing" to sign but would sign if the court would first 
"strike" the order to show cause (R. 102). The court asked if 
defendant was ready to admit the allegation that he had 
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previously refused to sign the probation agreement and if he was 
now willing to sign the agreement in open court (R. 102, 104). 
Defense counsel repeated that defendant was prepared to sign the 
agreement but the court should first dismiss the order to show 
cause (R. 104-105)• Defendant would not admit the allegation 
because his counsel "would not like him to have his probation 
violated for that reason" (.id.)* At the end of the discussion, 
the court stated: 
Mr. Ruesga, you've got a serious attitude 
problem. We're going to set this matter for 
a hearing. 
(R. 107). 
On June 2, 1992, defendant had still not signed the 
probation agreement and an evidentiary hearing was held (R. 109). 
Just as the first witness was being called, defense counsel 
stated, "Your Honor, Mr. Ruesga just asked me to state to the 
court that he feels he needs an interpreter who would interpret 
English to Spanish for his benefit" (R. 111). The court denied 
the request as untimely (id.). 
Ms. Shavers testified to her encounter with defendant 
and his refusal to sign the probation agreement (R. 111-117). 
Defendant then testified (R. 117-123). He did not substantially 
dispute Ms. Shavers' testimony and admitted: 
I did say apparently a few words. I was not 
aware of what I was really doing, because, 
see, I didn't know what probation was or 
anything. My lawyer was supposed to talk to 
me, and never did, before or after, and so I 
didn't know nothing about it. 
(R. 121). He denied that he had told Ms. Shavers that he would 
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not comply with the court's order but admitted that he had said 
that he "would rather do all the time, and just get out of [the 
jail] without probation" (R. 122). He agreed that he said he was 
going to Mexico but said he meant after he had completed 
probation (R. 118, 122). He stated that he "didn't understand 
English very well" and needed an interpreter to understand the 
agreement (R. 118-119). 
Defense counsel subsequently argued that this was an 
"unfortunate misunderstanding" due in part to defendant's 
"difficulty understanding what he's supposed to do" (R. 125-126). 
The court immediately asked if counsel was now claiming that 
defendant did not understand English "well enough to proceed in 
these proceedings" (R. 127). Defense counsel responded that he 
was "not saying that" (id.). 
The court orally announced its findings that defendant 
had intentionally and knowingly refused to sign the probation 
agreement and had, therefore, violated his probation (R. 127-
132). (See Addendum C for a transcript of the oral findings.) 
Finding that defendant was no longer an "appropriate candidate 
for probation," the court imposed the previously suspended fine 
and imprisonment (R. 134-135). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence is uncontroverted that defendant refused 
to sign the probation agreement when presented with it by the 
probation officer and failed to sign it when initially given an 
opportunity by the court. The only issue is whether this refusal 
constituted a wilful violation of his probation. The court found 
credible the probation officer's testimony that defendant's 
refusal was not predicated on a failure to understand his 
obligations but on his opposition to the terms of probation. The 
court discredited defendant's assertions to the contrary. Based 
on the evidence, the court had an adequate factual basis from 
which to conclude that defendant wilfully violated the terms of 
probation. Since the court's finding of a violation is not 
clearly erroneous, the court did not abuse its discretion in 
revoking the probation and executing the prison sentence. 
The court's factual finding that defendant sufficiently 
understood English so as to comprehend the court proceedings and 
terms of probation is also supported by the record. Other than 
defendant's claim that he needed a translator, there is no 
evidence that a translator was necessary or that defendant did 
not understand the proceedings. In fact, defendant's trial 
counsel, who remains as his co-appellate counsel, told the trial 
court that he was not claiming that defendant did not understand 
the court proceedings. Additionally, the court had extensive 
opportunities to observe defendant's use and understanding of the 
English language. Based on the totality of the record, the 
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court's finding is proper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD WILFULLY VIOLATED HIS PROBATION BY 
REFUSING TO SIGN THE PROBATION AGREEMENT AND, 
THEREFORE, DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REVOKING DEFENDANT'S PROBATION 
Defendant attacks the trial court's finding of a wilful 
violation in multiple ways: (1) he asserts that signing the 
probation agreement was not a term of probation (Br. of 
Appellant, Points I and II); (2) he argues that any violation was 
not wilful due to his failure to understand that signing the 
agreement was a condition of probation (Br. of App., Point II); 
and (3) he challenges the fifth finding of fact wherein the trial 
court found that defendant's failure to sign the agreement was a 
violation of probation (Br. of App., Point III). The gist of 
these claims is the same: there is no factual basis for the 
probation revocation. Thus, defendant's multiple arguments may 
be considered as a single inclusive issue: Is the finding of a 
wilful violation clearly erroneous such that the trial court 
abused its discretion in revoking defendant's probation? State 
v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209 (Utah App. 1991). 
A trial court's finding of a probation violation is 
factual and must be given deference on appeal unless it is 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Martinez, 811 P.2d at 
209. To challenge a revocation, an appellant "'must show that 
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the evidence of a probation violation, viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings, is so deficient that the 
trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation'." 
Archuleta, 812 P.2d at 82 (quoting State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 
798, 804 (Utah 1990)). Accord State v. Chavez, 198 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 52, 53 (Utah App. Oct. 22, 1992) (whenever an appellate 
argument is predicated on an analysis of the evidence, the 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's ruling and then establish, in light of this evidence, why 
the ruling is erroneous). 
Despite this mandate, defendant claims that the 
marshalling requirement is inapplicable to his appeal because the 
prosecutor prepared the written trial court findings (Br. of App. 
at 1-2, 16). The cases cited by defendant do not, however, 
support his argument: State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 
(Utah 1990); Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 
780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 
(Utah App. 1991). Contrary to defendant's assertion, as long as 
a judge signs submitted findings, the appellate court must assume 
that he found the findings "satisfactory in all particulars." 
Rio Vista Oil, 786 P.2d at 1347. Accord Automatic Control, 780 
P.2d at 1260 (a trial court may freely adopt the findings 
submitted by the prevailing party). It is only when a trial 
court totally abdicates "its decision-making function to the 
lawyer who prepared the document," that one Utah Supreme Court 
justice has advocated giving less deference to those findings. 
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Id. at 1263-64 (Zimmerman,J. concurring in result). Of course, 
appellate courts need not give deference to conclusions of law 
which are incorrectly labeled as findings. Rio Vista Oil, 786 
P.2d at 1347. Nor must they give deference to findings which are 
so conclusory that they do not "disclose the evidentiary basis 
for the court's decision." Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477 (citing 
State v. Lovecrren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah App. 1990)). 
Here, none of these circumstances are present. The 
court orally announced a detailed basis for its finding that a 
probation violation had occurred (R. 127-131) (Addendum C). The 
prosecutor then prepared written findings (R. 59-61) (Addendum 
D). Defendant had an opportunity to file written objections and 
to orally argue the objections to the court (R. 49-50, 137-145). 
In overruling the objections, the court stated: 
Mr. Ruesga had plenty of opportunity to enter 
into a probation agreement. He said what he 
said to Ms. Shavers, and I believe her 
account of the facts as opposed to his. With 
regard to the findings the State submitted, 
I'm satisfied that they were appropriate. I 
specifically found that while Mr. Ruesga had 
a limited understanding of English, he 
understood what was going on, and that's born 
out by the record. And I'm also satisfied 
that refusal to sign the probation agreement 
in the manner in which it was accomplished 
here as suggested by Ms. Shavers does in fact 
constitute a violation of probation. So I'm 
not satisfied that there's either an error in 
fact or law. 
(R. 143-44). The court then entered additional written findings, 
the first of which read: 
The Court having read the Findings of 
Probation Violation and Commitment submitted 
by Walter R. Ellett, Chief Deputy County 
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Attorney, believes such Findings reflect the 
reasoning of the Court, and accordingly the 
Court finds that such findings are correct 
and appropriate. 
(R. 81) (Addendum E). 
Defendant does not claim that the written findings are 
contrary to the oral pronouncements of the court or that they 
fail to disclose the evidentiary basis for the court's decision. 
Instead, the argument is simply that the trial court should not 
have allowed the prevailing party to assist in the preparation of 
the findings* Such a contention is specious. Automatic Control, 
780 P.2d at 1264 ("[t]rial judges are certainly entitled to ask 
the assistance of counsel in preparing findings of fact and 
conclusions of law11). Furthermore, the record clearly 
establishes that the court first ruled and then subsequently 
reviewed the proposed findings to see if they comported with his 
oral ruling. Finding that they did, the court signed the 
findings as a correct and appropriate reflection of his ruling. 
The obligation to marshal the evidence does not arise 
only from the existence of written findings; it is also demanded 
by the nature of the trial court's ruling that a violation 
occurred. Martinez, 811 P.2d at 209. The marshaling requirement 
is not satisfied by merely re-arguing defense evidence and 
claims. State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 1991). 
Rather, defendant must recite all evidence in favor of the 
court's ruling and then establish why this evidence is 
insufficient to support the court's finding of a violation. 
Archuleta, 812 P.2d at 82. Here, defendant has attempted to 
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avoid this responsibility altogether. But, even in those 
sections of his brief where defendant purports to discuss the 
evidence, he has only presented facts favorable to his arguments 
and not to the court's judgment. Under these circumstances, this 
Court should refuse to consider defendant's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the findings or the adequacy of the factual basis 
for the revocation• Scheel, 823 P.2d at 473. 
Because defendant's factual recitation so distorts the 
record, the State will discuss the evidence. In this way, 
defendant's failures to marshal and to analyze the evidence under 
the proper standard of review will be clearly seen. 
At the evidentiary hearing, defendant did not dispute 
much of the testimony of Ms. Shavers. In the areas where their 
testimony did conflict, the court found Ms. Shavers' testimony 
credible and defendant's not credible (R. 128) (Addendum C). 
Defendant testified that he knew he must comply with 
the demands of the probation department and any orders of the 
court (R. 119-120). He admitted that when faced with the 
probation terms, he stated that he would rather just do his time 
(R. 122). 
Ms. Shavers testified that defendant never claimed that 
he did not understand the terms of the agreement or its purpose 
(R. 114-115, 116-117). Just the opposite, defendant was arguing 
about the exact terms of the document and refusing to do anything 
that he did not feel the court.had specifically ordered him to do 
(R.116-117). He expressed disdain for the probation officer and 
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the court and threatened to simply leave the country if let out 
of jail (R. 114-116). He refused to discuss any disagreements 
and was argumentative, profane and agitated (id..). 
When given a two-week continuance to sign the 
agreement, defendant attempted to manipulate the court by 
insisting that he would only sign the agreement if the court 
first dismissed the order to show cause (R. 87-88, 102-103, 104-
105). He refused to admit the allegation, not because it was 
untrue, but because he did not want his probation revoked (R. 
104-105).l As the court noted, defendant generally appeared to 
have an "attitude problem" (R. 107). 
During the encounter with Ms. Shavers, defendant voiced 
his unwillingness to cooperate with the probation department or 
to comply with the court's orders (R. 114-116). In fact, he told 
another probationer/inmate that he should not sign his agreement 
or cooperate with the probation department (R. 114).2 
1
 Defendant, of course, had the right to deny any allegation 
and put the State to its proof. Here, defendant's reluctance to 
admit the allegation and simply sign the agreement was properly 
considered by the court in assessing the credibility of defendant's 
assertion that this was all an innocent misunderstanding (R. 129) 
(Addendum C). 
2
 Defendant asserts that the court violated his probation 
because of his "abuse" of the probation officer which he argues was 
impermissible because the probation was not "conditioned on his 
conversations with Ms. Shavers" (Br. of App. at 22). The 
contention is incorrect. First, any probationer is required to 
"make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation." 
Archuleta, 812 P. 2d at 84. Implicitly, a probationer must 
cooperate with his supervising officer. Second, the court noted 
that the abuse could constitute a violation but did not violate his 
probation for this (R. 129-130). The court did consider 
defendant's choice of expression as "suggestive of his refusal to 
cooperate and sign the agreement" (R. 128). (See Addendum C.) 
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Defendant is correct that the court did not 
specifically instruct defendant at the time of sentencing that he 
must sign a probation agreement as a condition of probation; 
however, the court's written judgment and commitment stated that 
defendant must abide by all "usual and ordinary conditions 
required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole" (R. 34) 
(Addendum A). Subsequent to the incident in the jail, the court 
specifically informed defendant that unless he signed the 
agreement, his probation would be violated (R. 88). Yet, 
defendant, without justification, continued to fail to sign the 
agreement. Below, defendant only minimally claimed that he did 
not "understand" his obligation to sign the agreement (R. 118-
119, 125, 127).3 His primary argument was that he understood 
the directives of A.P.P. but disagreed with the terms of the 
agreement (R. 121-122, 126, 141). Whatever the justification, 
defendant clearly understood that if he did not sign the 
agreement, no probation would occur and the alternative was to 
"do his time" (R. 119-120). Given these facts, it was reasonable 
for the court to conclude that defendant's protestation of an 
innocent misunderstanding was not credible (R. 128). 
Defendant admits that "the evidence largely supports 
findings 1, 2, and 4" (Br. of App. at 17), which read: 
3
 Defendant only claimed that signing the probation agreement 
was not a term of probation during the post-revocation hearing on 
his objections to the findings and his motion to reconsider 
sentence (R. 141). During the revocation hearing itself, 
defendant's claim was that he was generally "confused" since he 
believed the probation agreement contained terms different than 
those ordered by the court (R. 116-117, 118-123, 125). 
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1. That the defendant, when requested by 
probation officer Lisa Shavers, refused to 
execute a standard probation agreement. 
2. That the terms and conditions of 
probation were individually explained to 
defendant by Agent Shavers. 
• • • 
4. That the defendant knowingly, 
intentionally and purposely refused to sign 
the probation agreement presented to him by 
Agent Shavers. 
(R. 60) (Addendum D ) / Despite the evidence in support of these 
unchallenged findings, defendant asserts that the failure was not 
"wilful" and therefore not a basis upon which to revoke probation 
(Br. of App. at 17). Yet, during his discussion of wilfulness, 
defendant fails to acknowledge this Court's definition of the 
term. In Archuleta, 812 P.2d at 84, this Court made clear that 
"wilful" need not rise to the level of intentional; instead, a 
finding of wilfulness amounts to a finding that defendant failed 
to make "bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of probation." 
Here, the trial court found that defendant intentionally and 
knowingly refused to sign the probation agreement (R. 60, 128-
129) and that finding is unchallenged on appeal (Br. of App. at 
17). As such, the court found more evidence of a violation than 
necessary for a wilful violation. 
Defendant has failed to establish any abuse of 
discretion by the trial court and, therefore, the order revoking 
* Defendant does challenge findings 3 and 5. The challenge to 
finding 5, finding a violation, is subsumed under the general 
sufficiency discussion. Finding 3 regarding defendant's 
understanding of English is more specifically discussed, infra, in 
Point II. 
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defendant's probation must be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD AN ADEQUATE COMMAND OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE SO AS TO UNDERSTAND THE CONDITIONS 
OF PROBATION AND THE COURT PROCEEDINGS 
Aside from the findings discussed above, defendant 
attacks the trial court's third finding: 
3. That the defendant, while having a 
limited understanding of English, has an 
adequate command of the English language to 
fully understand the proceedings before this 
Court and the conditions of probation as 
presented by Agent Shavers. 
(R. 60) (Addendum D). Defendant incorporates in this challenge 
the additional claim that he was denied due process by the' 
court's denial of an interpreter during the revocation hearing 
(Br. of App. at 18-22). Neither challenge is supported by the 
record. 
Throughout the proceedings below, defendant had the 
same counsel, Roger Scowcroft, Salt Lake Legal Defender's 
Association. With this counsel, defendant was arraigned and 
appeared for several proceedings in circuit court, including a 
full preliminary hearing (R. 3-4). During none of these 
proceedings was an interpreter requested or provided (.id. ). With 
the same counsel, defendant was arraigned in district court and 
subsequently entered a guilty plea (R. 18-19, 22-28). No 
interpreter was requested or provided (.id.). In his statement in 
advance of plea, defendant acknowledged that he could read and 
understand the English language (R. 26). Defendant then made two 
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more appearances for purposes of sentencing; at neither was an 
interpreter provided or requested (R. 30, 33-34). Subsequently, 
defendant appeared on the order to show cause on May 4 and 18, 
1992. Neither time was an interpreter requested or provided (R. 
36-37, 43). 
During the entire proceedings below, defendant only 
asked for an interpreter on one occasion. Just as the first 
witness was being called during the evidentiary hearing on the 
order to show cause, defense counsel said, "Your Honor, Mr. 
Ruesga just asked me to state to the court that he feels he needs 
an interpreter who would interpret English to Spanish for his 
benefit" (R. 111). The court responded, "Too late. Proceed" 
(id.). No other objection or request for an interpreter was made 
during the course of the proceedings. 
When defendant testified, the record reflects no 
difficulty in either understanding the questions asked or in 
responding in English (R. 117-123). Additionally, defendant 
freely read from a letter written in English (R. 118-119). When 
asked if he wrote the letter, defendant said "somebody helped me 
place the words that I meant to say" but admitted that he wrote 
it (R. 123). 
During argument at the end of the evidentiary hearing, 
defense counsel stated that defendant has a "heavy accent" and "I 
do believe that he has some difficulty understanding what he's 
supposed to do here" (R. 125). The following exchange then 
occurred: 
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THE COURT: Are you telling me, Mr. Scowcroft, 
that with regard to your client's 
understanding that it's now your position 
that he doesn't understand the English 
language well enough to proceed in these 
proceedings? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: I'm not saying that, Judge. 
We've not had an interpreter during these 
proceedings. There have been a number of 
appearancess [sic] we've made in court, and 
I've spoken with Mr. Ruesga on a number of 
occasions. Do I think, though, that there is 
a significant — well, I shouldn't say that -
- I think his command of the English language 
is somewhat marginal, and I think his heavy 
accent is evidence of that. That's all I 
could say really in that regard. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm glad to hear you're not 
taking that position now. 
(R. 127). Based on his own observations of defendant during 
several hearings, including defendant's responses during the 
change of plea, the sentencing, and the revocation hearing, the 
court entered its finding that defendant sufficiently understood 
the English language (R. 60, 130-131).5 
When the court entered this oral finding, defense 
counsel did not object even though he did argue against other 
findings (R. 60, 130-131, 144). When the written findings were 
proposed, defendant filed a written objections to finding 3 
concerning defendant's understanding of English and finding 5 
regarding the finding of a violation (R. 49-50). During the 
hearing on the objections, defendant did not argue against 
5
 During the revocation hearing, defendant stated that the 
court had never allowed him to speak during the sentencing hearing 
(R. 119). This assertion is not supported by the record (R. 95-
96). 
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finding 3 but confined his argument to finding 5: 
As you recall, Mr. Ruesga refused to sign a 
probation agreement. That some of the 
testimony at the hearing that was held on 
June 2d in this matter was that Mr. Ruesga, 
according to Ms. Shavers, refused to sign it, 
because he believed he had not been ordered 
to comply with certain conditions in the 
document. Our position, Your Honor, is that 
refusal to sign the agreement is not itself a 
violation of probation. Further, it's 
contrary — its' contrary to Mr. Ruesga's 
testimony, that being he fully intends to 
comply with probation. Also, we feel that it 
was not a deliberate refusal to comply with 
the conditions contained in the document 
because he testified he — Ms. Shavers 
testified he did not understand, did not 
believe that some of those condition [sic] 
had been ordered by the Court. 
(R. 141).6 
Further, even though defendant minimally claimed that 
he "misunderstood" his probation obligations due to a lack of 
understanding of English, his real argument was: (1) that the 
probation officer misinterpreted his statements concerning Mexico 
(R.103-104, 122), (2) that he never said some of the statements 
attributed to him by the probation officer (R. 122), and (3) that 
he understood so well that he could tell that the probation 
agreement contained conditions allegedly different from those 
ordered by the court (R. 116-117, 141). Under these 
6
 Normally, it is not necessary for a party to specifically 
object to a finding in order to challenge it on appeal. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(b). But here, defense counsel informed the court that 
it was not contending that defendant lacked a sufficient capacity 
to understand English (R. 127). Under such circumstances, 
defendant could only preserve the issue below by retreating from 
this stance and arguing some factual basis for the claim that 
defendant did not sufficiently understand English. 
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circumstances, defendant has failed to preserve for appeal any 
challenge to the finding that he sufficiently understood English. 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). 
Even if the merits were considered, defendant's 
argument is not supportable. As discussed in Point I, defendant 
has made no attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's finding but has selectively chosen facts favorable 
to his argument. Most telling is his failure to even acknowledge 
his counsel's concession to the trial court judge that he was not 
advocating that defendant's lack of English was so deficient as 
to hinder his understanding of the court proceedings. 
The record amply supports finding 3 (Addendum D). 
Significantly, if the record were to the contrary and the finding 
erroneous, the ramifications would be far-reaching. Not only 
would his probation revocation be reversed, but defendant's lack 
of understanding of English would be a basis to vacate his plea. 
Yet, defendant has never asserted such a claim. Further, if the 
trial court's finding that defendant sufficiently understood 
English is erroneous, his trial counsel, who remains as co-
appellate counsel, could be found ineffective for having allowing 
defendant to change his plea without a translator present. 
22 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's revocation of defendant's probation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <37^day of November, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Roger K. Scowcraft, Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc, attorneys for appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this *W) day of December, 1992. 
t /DF<6aJ'/l\ 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
i-'AA 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
vs. 
FERNANDO RUESGA CPTS^ 
Defendant. 
Case No. . 
Count No. 
Honorable 
Clerk 
Reporter -
Bailiff 
Date 
9119018*12 FS 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
E. THOMPSON 
B. NEUENSCHWANDER 
J . WEISS 
APRIL 6, 1992 
D The motion of. . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; & plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
 a fe|0ny 
of the 2 - degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready tor sentence and 
represented b f* S C 0 W CR°F T
 (and the State being represented by K* HORNAK > i s n o w adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of. years and which may be for life; 
C9 not to exceed five years; 
Q of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
& and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 5,000; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ 
a n 355% 
* " * * . 
to. 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with . 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
are hereby dismissed. O upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) . 
8 THE COURT SUSPENDS ALL BUT $1.500 OF THE FINE TO BE PAID ALONG WITH A 25% SURCHARGE. 
IS Defendant is granted a stay of the above (CXprison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of i s MONTHS pursuant to the attached/conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or O for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jajk'where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commjtfnent. 
D Commitment shall issue 
DATED this £L_ day of *RU .19_S2L 
COPIES TO COUNSEL 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
ATTEST 
Judgment/State v. FERNANDO RUESGA 7CR 
911901842 FS 
—/Honorable HANSON 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
J5 Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole. 
& Serve SIX MONTHS 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing FORTHWITH, CREDIT FOR TIME SERVEP. 
& Pay a fine in the amount of $JL.# 5QQd at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; or ttat the rate of WTTHTN THF PRORATION PFRTOQ, A 9 U SURCHARGF APPI TFS . 
D Pay restitution in the amount of $. 
Probation and Parole; • at a rate of, 
4 or D in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
; or • at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, 
fi Enter, participate in, and complete any DR1JG/A1 rOHOI program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or D vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with 
Participate in and complete any 
Probation and Parole; or D with 
. training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
K Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
B Submit to drug testing. 
X) Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
B Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
JO Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
J5 Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
J5 Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
J5 Take antabuse CXas directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
ft Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
D Maintain full-time employment. 
D Obtain and maintain full-timie employment or full-time schooling. 
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
Complete — D 
D 
fi 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
. hours of community service restitution in lieu of. 
Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on -
THF OFFFMOAMT TS TO FSTARI TSH RF^TDFNPY, 
. days in jail. 
. for a review of this sentence, 
DATED this day of. 
A -r DISJRICT^COURT JUDGE 
Page 2- of. 
Rt HANSON 
000034 
rV*TL «. />W. 4 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (#5141) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
FILES KSTRiCY^HT 
Third Jud^a! District 
APR 1 6 1992 
Glert> 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FRENANDO 0. RUESGA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER FOR CREDIT 
FOR TIME SERVED 
Case No. 911901842FS 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant, FERNANDO 0. 
RUESGA, receive credit for 20 (twenty) days incarceration 
already served toward the Order of Commitment issued by this 
Court on April 6, 1992. 
DATED this //? day of April, 1992. 
'HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Third District Court 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this / S day of Apxil, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM B 
#/3 FILED DISTRICT COURT Third Judicial District 
APR 2 7 1992 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
d&IyaU' 
•HE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f 
S 
ERNANDO RUESGA 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Court Case No: 911901842 
Judge: Timothy R. Hanson 
Def. Atty.: R. Scowcroft 
TATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
)UNTY OF SALT LAKE 
LISA SHAVERS, being duly sworn upon an oath deposes and 
rys that: She is a Probation Officer for the Utah State Department of 
erections; that on the 18th day of February, 1992, the above-named 
>fendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Possession of Controlled 
bstance in the above-entitled Court, and on the 6th day of April, 1992, 
s sentenced to serve a term of 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison; that 
e execution of the imposed sentence was stayed and the defendant was 
aced on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections; 
at the above-entitled defendant did violate the terms and conditions of 
e defendant's probation as follows, to-wit: 
1. That the defendant refused to sign a Probation Agteempn' nn unified 
by the Court. 
n n A A ^  p 
FERNANDO RUESGA 
-2-
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order of the Court issue 
ecting and requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before 
d Court to show cause, if any, he has, why the aforesaid period of 
>bation should not be revoked, and why said defendant should not be 
thwith committed to the Utah State Prison. 
LISA SHAVERS, PROBATION OFFICER 
bscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing: Salt Lake City, Utah 
Commission expires: "7~gg£ -<f £~ 
I ^ ' » 5 \ NOTARY PUBLIC 
!
 /f/iSS&^i Gerafdine E. Schmidt 
275 East 200 Soutn 
Sat Lake City, Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires 
July 26,1995 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooorr 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT REGARDING: Fernando Ruesga 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
iTTN: Judge Timothy R. Hanson CASE NO.: 911901842 
ROM: Field Operations/Region III OFFENSE: Possession of 
Controlled Substance 
ATE: April 22, 1992 
ROBATION DATE: 04/06/1990 OBSCIS: 00066110 
MPLOYMENT: None ADDRESS: Salt Lake County Jail 
EFENSE ATTORNEY: R. Scowcroft 
DMMENTS: The defendant was placed on probation with the conditions he: 
Serve 6 months in jail; 
Pay $1,8785.00 fine and fees; 
Complete a drug and alcohol treatment program; 
Submit to drug testing; 
Refrain from the use of illegal drugs; 
Refrain from the use of alcohol; 
Take Antabuse; 
Obtain full-time job; and, 
Establish residency. 
e defendant was interviewed in the Salt Lake County Jail on April 16, 
92, During that interview he refused to sign his Probation Agreement, 
was quite profane and very adamant that he would not comply with the 
urtfs order. He stated, he would go to Mexico. 
light of these facts, we can not supervise the defendant. We request 
Order to Show Cause Hearing. 
MEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT: NOTIFY SUPERVISOR AND THE COURT. 
COMMENDATION:,/BORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING. 
- 4 ^ r r ^ ^ 
SIALD'D. COOK, SUPERVISOR LISA SHAVERS, PROBATION OFFICER^ 
APPROVED AND ORDERED: 
DENIED: / ^ / S 
DATE: t//2 7/^t^ C^l' 
50S/gk COMMENTS: ' IM l ; L 
rJLED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UTAH IN AND FOR SALT LAKE CC 
, n V ' ; . v - - -iSTRICT 
BY 
E STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f 
:RNANDO RUESGA 
Defendant 
»
 Tv
 CLERK 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Court Case No.: 911901842 
Judge: Timothy R. Hanson 
Def. Atty.: R. Scowcroft 
Upon a reading of the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause, the 
>urt finds probable cause to believe that the defendant in this matter has 
.olated the terms and conditions of his probation as set forth in the 
ifidavit, and that revocation or modification of defendant's probation is 
istified. 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant appear before the Honorable Timothy R. 
anson, Judge of the above-entitled Court, at the Judge's courtroom in Salt 
ake City, Utah, on the day of /fl&Cjy ., 1923-at the hour of 9s?** 
tien and there to show cause why the probation of said defendant should not 
s 
5 revoked or modified by the Court based upon the allegations contained in 
he Affidavit on file with the Court, 
The defendant has a right to be represented by counsel at the 
bove-described hearing and to have appointed to represent the O^renOnni if 
he defendant is indigent. 
000041 
RE: FERNANDO RUESGA 
-2-
:he defendant a l so has a r ight to present evidence as provided in the Utah 
tules of C i v i l Procedure. 
DATED THIS 9 I day Of O^QALAJ / l 9 ^ T ~ 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that this Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in support 
lereof, was personally served upon the defendant at S ^ -^£ V ^ " i 
~6-
r
 showing the original and informing the defendant of its contents, and 
slivering a copy on the w^cT day of ^ *~^ 
re delivered to ^<S^^^K^ \ — r ffyvy-i? <<vf |— ' 
t 19 [Zj additional copies 
_, counsel for the 
fendant, on the day of 
LISA SHAVERS, PROBATION OFFICER 
50S/gk 
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ADDENDUM C 
1 I think that based on the way he performed to 
2 Pre-trial Services, it's a good bet that he'll do well 
3 with AP&P. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further 
5 from the State? 
6 MR. ELLETT: No, Your Honor, we'd submit it. 
7 THE COURT: Are you telling me, Mr. 
8 Scowcroft, that with regard to your client's 
9 understanding that it's now your position that he doesn't 
10 understand the English language well enough to proceed in 
11 these proceedings? 
12 MR. SCOWCROFT: I#m not saying that, Judge. 
13 We've not had an interpreter during these proceedings. 
14 There have been a number of appearancess we've made in 
15 court, and I've spoken with Mr. Ruesga on a number of 
16 occasions. Do I think, though, that there is a 
17 significant — well, I shouldn't say — I think his 
18 command of the English language is somewhat marginal, and 
19 I think his heavy accent is evidence of that. That's all 
20 i could say really in that regard. 
21 THE COURT: Well, I'm glad to hear you're not 
22 taking that position now. With regard to the order to 
23 show cause with which we're concerned here today, that is 
24 J the allegation that the defendant has refused, 
intentionally and knowingly refused, I suppose I read 
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25 
1 that into it, to sign the probation agreement as is 
2 customarily required, and part of this court's 
3 requirement for probation supervision, the court is 
4 satisfied that there has in fact been a violation of the 
5 terms and conditions of probation by the defendant 
6 initially, and that is based upon his refusal to even 
7 start the probation process by refusing in no uncertain 
8 terms at the request of Ms. Shavers to sign the probation 
9 agreement once it had been explained to him. 
10 With regard to the dispute in testimony regarding 
11 what may have occurred, and what may not have occurred at 
12 the county jail when Ms. Shavers attempted to explain — 
13 not attempted to, she did explain, and the defendant 
14 refused to agree to the terms of probation, I find that 
15 Ms. Shavers' testimony is believable. I find the 
16 defendant's is not. 
17 I find the occurrences were as Ms. Shavers suggested 
18 to me were, and testified to. To the extent that the 
19 defendant's testimony is contrary, I do not believe it. I 
20 don't find it credible. Of particular importance I think 
21 is the defendant's attitude suggesting to Ms. Shavers, 
22 that he could do as he chose. His choice of language is 
23 not only inappropriate, but suggestive of his refusal to 
24 cooperate, and sign the agreement. So accordingly, I'm 
25 satisfied that he has knowingly and intelligently, and 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR «'< U.J4 0 ""Wife 
1 with purpose refused to cooperate with Adult Probation 
2 and Parole and sign the probation agreement. 
3 I think that's further enhanced by what has occurred 
4 since that was brought to my attention. One would assume 
5 if there is a misunderstanding as alleged by the 
6 defendant, that I found did not occur, but he understood 
7 what was happening, but even if that was believable, 
8 which it is not, certainly when he found out what was 
9 going to happen, one would expect him to immediately do 
10 what was necessary to remedy the situation for his first 
11 appearance in court. The record will speak for itself. 
12 But his first appearance in court, according to my 
13 recollection, was further attempts to argue and explain 
14 why he didn't have to do the things he was supposed to. 
15 There was a clear opportunity to sign it, and he has 
16 refused. Therefore, I find he's violated the terms and 
17 conditions of his probation before this court by failing« 
18 to agree to the terms and conditions of probation. And 
19 inasmuch as probation is a privilege and not a right, the 
20 defendant could choose not to be on probation if he 
21 likes, and he has made that choice. 
22 Finally, I'm satisfied on that same subject, that 
23 because probation is a privilege, because resources are 
24 limited in that regard, and because persons like Ms* 
25 Shavers who deal with defendants who are being supervised 
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1 on probation, it's not part of their job description to 
2 take abuse from defendants, and certainly not the type of 
3 abuse that's been described here. That in and of itself 
4 is a violation of probation. She doesn't have to put up 
5 with that. And I intend to see that she doesn't to the 
6 extent that I have the ability to do that. 
7 Therefore, I find that defendant has in fact 
8 violated the terms and conditions of his probation. With 
9 regard to the suggestion of the defendant both in Exhibit 
10 2, and as stated on the record, at least made reference 
11 to by Mr. Scowcroft, the defendant doesn't have command 
12 J of the English language sufficient to allow him to 
13 understand what's going on, I find that statement — 
14 while I'm satisfied he doesn't have the command of the 
15 English language that others may, it is sufficient so 
16 that he understands what happens here in the court. 
17 There has never been a suggestion until this hearing that 
18 he had difficulty with understanding or communicating the 
19 English language. He appeared in this court, he 
20 understood the Boykin process, he reviewed the affidavit. 
21 He has handwritten Exhibit 2, and signed it. He read it. 
22 The court is satisfied that his suggestion that he may be 
23 somewhat impaired, or misunderstood things because of his 
24 lack of understanding of the English language is without 
25 merit, and I reject it. I think he does have an 
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1 understanding, and did at the time. 
2 All right. Is there any reason I ought not to 
3 impose the original sentence, and send Mr. Ruesga to 
4 prison? 
5 MR. ELLETT: Not as far as we're concerned, 
6 Your Honor. 
7 MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think there is, 
8 Judge. Every time he's appeared in court since the 
9 sentencing, the prior hearing on the 18th of May of this 
10 year, today, he stated that he would sign the agreement, 
11 and that he would comply. 
12 THE COURT: Not true, Mr. Scowcroft. He may 
13 have said it as he was going out the door, but he wanted 
14 to argue with me the first time he was here. I'm not 
15 going to argue with people about probation. If they 
16 don't want to be on probation, I don't care. 
17 MR. SCOWCROFT: I really do. Our position at 
18 the last hearing was that we simply asked the court to 
19 allow him to be on probation, and that he would sign. We 
20 asked the court at that time to dismiss the allegation, 
21 allow him to serve out his time, and be on probation 
22 based on his willingness to sign. So my recollection, 
23 Judge, is that every time he's appeared in court, these 
24 three hearings, he has offered to sign the agreement, and 
25 he does today. 
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ADDENDUM D 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
WALTER R. ELLETT, 0980 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
) FINDINGS OF PROBATION 
Plaintiff, VIOLATION AND COMMITMENT 
v. Case No. 911901842FS 
FERNANDO RUESGA, Honorable Timothy R. Hansen 
Defendant. 
Having heretofore adjudged the defendant guilty of the offense of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, the Court, on the 
6th day of April, 1992, imposed sentence on the defendant that the defendant be 
committed to the Utah State Prison for the term not to exceed five years, and 
was fined as provided by law for the offense of which the defendant was 
adjudged guilty. 
The Court stayed the execution of such sentences and placed the 
defendant on probation in the custody of the Chief Agent, Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole, upon various conditions. 
On the 2nd day of June, 1992, the defendant appeared in person and with 
counsel, Roger Scowcroft, to answer to an affidavit In support of an Order of 
O f f fS<? 
Show Cause in re the revocation of defendant's probation. The State was 
represented by Walter R. Eliett. 
The Court received evidence by way of testimony and written exhibits. 
Exhibit number 2 was a hand written and signed statement prepared by and 
submitted by the defendant. 
Based upon the evidence presented and considering arguments of 
counsel the Court finds as follows: 
1. That the defendant, when requested by probation officer Lisa 
Shavers, refused to execute a standard probation agreement. 
2. That the terms and conditions of probation were individually 
explained to defendant by Agent Shavers. 
3. That the defendant, while having a limited understanding of 
English, has an adequate command of the English language to fully understand 
the proceedings before this Court and the conditions of probation as presented 
by Agent Shavers. 
4. That the defendant knowingly, intentionally and purposely refused 
to sign the probation agreement presented to him by Agent Shavers. 
5. That the failure of the defendant to execute and enter into the 
agreement of probation constitutes a violation of the probation granted the 
defendant by the Court. 
From the foregoing findings the Court now enters the following order and 
judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the probation of the defendant Fernando Ruesga be and the 
same is hereby revoked. 
2. It is further ordered that the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah take the defendant Fernando Ruesga forthwith and deliver him to the 
ooocnn 
Warden, Utah State Prison, Draper, UT, where said defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with the sentence imposed on April 6,1992. 
3. It is recommended that the defendant be given credit for time 
served in this matter. 
Dated this I day of June, 1992. 
BY 
"IMOTHY R. H A ^ E N ^ " 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
Delivered a copy of the foregoing Findings and Order to Roger Scowcroft, 
Attorney for Defendant, by placing the same in the Legal Defenders Association 
courier box at the Office of the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, 
for pick-up and delivery to the said Roger Scowcroft this 3 day of June, 1992. 
carol\memo\ruesga.doc [J 
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Third Judicial District 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
GREGORY M. WARNER, Bar No. 3388 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South# Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH# ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. ) Case No. 911901842FS 
FERNANDO RUESGA, ) 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendant. ) 
The Defendant's Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal, 
his Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, and his Objections to 
the Proposed Findings of Probation Violation and Commitment, came 
on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled court on June 
22, 1992, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. The Defendant was represented 
by his attorney, Roger K. Scowcroft, and the State of Utah was 
represented by it's attorney, Gregory M. Warner. The Court having 
heard the arguments of the parties presented in open court, now 
makes and enters the following: 
FJNPINGS QT FAQT 
1. The Court having read the Findings of Probation 
Violation and Commitment submitted by Walter R. Ellett, Chief 
Deputy County Attorney, believes such Findings reflect the 
reasoning of the Court, and accordingly the Court finds that such 
findings are correct and appropriate. 
JUL 1 4 1992 
Deputy CTerk 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 911901842FS 
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2. The Court having reviewed and considered it's 
findings and reasoning from the Order to Show Cause hearing 
conducted on June 3, 1992, hereby finds that the above-named 
defendant was in violation of his probation and accordingly feels 
commitment to the Utah State Prison is appropriate. 
3. The Court finds that the Defendant has not 
exhibited any reason to stay his sentence pending appeal pursuant 
to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, having herefore entered it's Findings of Fact, 
the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendant's Motion to Stay Sentence Pending 
Appeal# the Defendant's Objections to the Proposed Findings of Fact 
of Probation Violation and Commitment, and the Defendant's Motion 
for Reconsideration of Sentence, are hereby denied since they have 
no legal basis in fact for the Court to grant J5uch motions. 
DATED this ( Y day of July, 199^ 
orm: 
IONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Third District Court Judge 
^4^^"^^^ 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for the Defendant d i 
By, 
BepuVCterk 
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State v. Ruesga 
Case No. 911901842FS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /(r^ day of July, 1992, I 
nailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order to ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, Attorney 
for Defendant, at the address stated below. 
/r^cH^us^ ( J£L./^-
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, ESQ. 
Attorney for the Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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